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Introduction 
 
This article examines public reactions on social media to the 13 November 2015 attacks by 
Islamic State on Paris that were driven by the Twitter hashtag #PrayforParis and the response 
from those adopting a #PrayforSyria hashtag. The latter appeared to contest the exclusive or 
primary attention of Twitter users to conflict in Paris over conflict in Syria and elsewhere. 
We gathered nearly three million tweets containing the hashtags #prayforparis and 
#prayforsyria in the days after the attack. As a research team observing news media coverage 
of the attacks and apparently backlashes against Muslims and/or migrants in Europe, we 
expected to find debate around these hashtags would contain users conflating three issues 
around the attacks: (i) migration: were the attackers homegrown or carrying overseas 
passports? (ii) violence: why was Paris attacked and why is France bombing Islamic State? 
(iii) media: what role should mainstream media and social media play during such events? In 
the event’s aftermath, debates raged about whether news media and social media platforms 
like Facebook offer disproportionate attention to casualties in Paris (See Figure 1 below) 
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when catastrophes were unfolding simultaneously in Lebanon, Japan and elsewhere. Such 
debates condition immediate public and policy responses – the backlash – but also shape how 
public spheres function in the long term.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg explains Facebook’s Safety Check policy 
 
The aim of this study is to identify and explain the main differences in the contents, sources, 
and diffusion networks of the tweets about the Paris and Syria attacks. We build on previous 
research exploring how social media affordances encourage certain communication 
behaviours. We make two empirical contributions. First, we operationalise complex and fuzzy 
concepts from political and social theory through systematic descriptive, bivariate and 
multivariate analysis of public communication. We first test the hypothesis that the 
#PrayforSyria Tweets were more argumentative. We know from political theory that 
presenting an argument in public necessarily makes one vulnerable or exposed – to 
confrontation, misrepresentation, or simply being ignored (Cavarero 2000). We know from 
social theory that tweeting in more directly confrontational ways carries a higher affective 
demand than simply sharing other people’s information (Miller, 2012). It involves greater 
“identity work”: one risks one’s “face” in posting a politically-charged statement or directly 
posting a comment to an original commenter through Twitter’s reply function. We 
conceptualise argumentative behaviour through the concepts agonism and antagonism 
(Mouffe, 2000). Antagonism refers to statements that seek to exclude others from the shared 
space of politics: to either kill people or drive them out of the debate. Agonism refers to 
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statements that dispute a policy or perspective but do not seek the exclusion or destruction of 
those they disagree with. Agonism and Antagonism are processes, not end-points; they are 
forms of action that constitute the endless play of claim and counter-claim that defines “the 
political”. We expect to find more agonism and antagonism in #PrayforSyria tweets than 
#PrayforParis because, drawing on the “pray for Syria” trope that had been present in Syrian 
Facebook discussions since 2013 (Crilley, 2016), users remixed it as a hashtag with the 
apparent motivation to contest the distribution of global attention and hierarchy of pity 
(Boltanski, 1999). However, given the conflation of discussion of media, migration and 
terrorism in European news media itself (Berry et al., 2015), we test the second hypothesis 
that users conflate discussion of media, migration and terrorism.  
 
The second empirical contribution, then, is to explain the drivers of agonism and antagonism. 
We do this by testing the degree to which agonism and antagonism are correlated with 
retweet volumes, topic of debate, location, and type of user. We take retweets as key 
indicators: retweets refer to the act of sharing another user’s tweet to their own followers by 
clicking the RT symbol that accompanies that tweet. Retweets indicate the popularity of a 
tweet. We analyse them as dependent variables because this explains what properties of 
tweets are more likely to be popular and spread. Among replies to less-retweeted posts we 
expect to find less antagonism. However, regards hypothesis two, we also explore whether 
the conflation of media, migration and terrorism drives the presence of agonism and 
antagonism. 
 
This article makes two theoretical contributions. First, this research helps us understand how 
ethics work in a global digital ecology. The shift from broadcast to Web 2.0 offers interaction 
and thus those suffering can be present with us, not presented to us (Miller, 2012). Floridi 
argues: ‘we are witnessing a substantial erosion of the right to ignore’ (2014: 42). He 
continues: ‘The more any bit of information is just an easy click away, the less we shall be 
forgiven for not checking it. ICTs are making humanity increasingly responsible, morally 
speaking, for the way the world is, will be, and should be’ (2014: 42-3). Nevertheless, our 
digital communities still have boundaries. Some remain invisible to us. Consequently, some 
feel the need to make connectivity, to bring those suffering outside our networks to presence 
within them. The #PrayforSyria promotion was one such effort: to bring another set of 
suffering humans to visible presence and recognition. Our study is set against a context in 
which hyperconnectivity could cultivate a new mass responsibility. How are audiences to 
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compare and evaluate several tragedies? Was #PrayforSyria making the point that it is 
possible to care about more than one tragedy at once, or to bring balance between Western 
and non-Western tragedies, or some other motive?  
 
Second, this research illuminates some new patterns in social responses to trigger events 
such as terrorist attacks. Our conception of ‘cycles of insecurity’ builds on a trajectory of 
sociological research on the role of mainstream media in amplifying moral panics. 
Particularly in the wake of disruptive social and political events, news reporting often 
demonises certain social groups as ‘folk devils’ in ways that validated existing prejudices 
against such groups in ways that feed into communicative and even physical violence against 
them, triggering further rounds of counter-attacks and reprisals (Cohen, 1972; Hall et al., 
1978; Poynting et al., 2004). For several decades, this theory was relatively settled because 
the public sphere was anchored by television, radio and press. However, criminologists have 
now begun to explore how social media enable different types of dynamics that amplify hate 
speech and possibly violence. Williams and Burnap (2016) studied public responses on social 
media to the London 2013 terrorist attack that saw the murder of soldier Lee Rigby. They 
applied Cohen’s moral panics theory to identify degrees of hate speech in the initial impact 
stage before police and mainstream media had confirmed what was happening. Analysing 15 
days of Tweets following the event, they found it was only in that initial few hours, before 
the ‘‘terrestrial’ paced police response’ could impose official meaning, that hate speech 
appeared with any frequency (ibid., 234); the police response soon stifled any cycle of 
insecurity and racist backlash. Importantly, Williams and Burnap found evidence of ‘counter-
cyberhate speech’ (ibid., 233). Social media allow individuals to openly express this desire 
for positive intercultural relations and minimisation of antagonism. For example, after the 
Brussels attacks in March 2016 the #StopIslam hashtag emerged as a Twitter trending topic 
around the world but its surge in frequency was due to people contesting it and condemning 
racism (Dewey, 2016).  
 
This study explores new mechanisms through which publics and counter-publics form and 
seek to make issues visible and themselves recognisable as publics making claims (Barnett, 
2003; Warner, 2002). These new patterns are not only of interest for theorising media and 
insecurity. They can also be expected to feed into all actors’ assumptions about how 
communication patterns will unfold after terrorist attacks or other catastrophes. In this way, 
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the ‘cycles of insecurity’ acquire altered dynamics that will affect perceptions and behaviour. 
Hence, it is vital we understand how antagonism is generated.  
 
Mass responses on social media: Shifting from emotion to antagonism 
 
Studies evaluating emotion in politics in social media content have tended to use sentiment 
binaries rather than scales. Either an emotion is present/absent or emotion is positive/negative. 
Human-coded studies of emotion on Twitter, particularly since the Arab Uprisings, have 
focused on one particular emotion per study, for instance ‘enthusiasm’ or ‘feeling of drive’. 
These offer little conceptual validity. Moreover, there are no systematic studies of political 
contestation in user interactions, such as individuals’ use of #PrayforSyria to make claims 
about Syria’s relation to the Paris attacks. This warrants a turn to theories of political 
contestation. In this section we define an antagonistic tweet in contrast to an agonistic tweet.  
 
Antagonism is associated with emotion, and emotion affects behavior online. Several studies 
have found that valence (strong positive/negative sentiment) and arousal (high/low 
excitement) associates with increased sharing of content on social media by users (Berger, 
2011; Berger and Milkman, 2012; Larson et al, 2011). Researching the US movement Black 
Lives Matter and #Blacklivesmatter hashtag, Freelon et al (2016) coded tweets as supportive, 
opposed or non-aligned to the movement. They used interviews with movement activists to 
explain whether certain Twitter surges were motivated by emotions such as anger. They did 
not code emotion or antagonism in tweets in any transparent or granular manner. 
 
Two major studies of social media emotion again miss contestation. Meraz and Papacharissi 
(2013) analysed 959,893 Latin character Tweets from the month beginning 24 January 2011 
when protests began in Cairo calling for President Mubarak to resign. The validity of coding 
for emotion was undermined because they found fact and emotion difficult to disentangle: 
‘most tweets were not just news or just opinion, but typically a blend of emotionally charged 
opinions on news’ (ibid: 156). As certain charged pieces of news became retweeted, so they 
took on the function of refrains analogous to those found in music, marking ‘an intensity that 
provides the pulse for a growing movement’ (ibid: 156). They then used qualitative analysis 
– ‘notes taken regarding language use and tone’ – to document what they labeled ‘a feeling of 
ongoing drive’ as users expressed anticipation and excitement about a revolution to come 
(ibid: 148, 160). Gerbaudo (2016) builds on Meraz and Papacharissi’s study by seeking to 
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quantify these emotional dynamics. Taking the protest Facebook pages of KKS (We are all 
Khaled Said) in the 2011 Egyptian revolution and the DRY (Real Democracy Now) page 
from Spanish protests of the same year, Gerbaudo identifies what he calls ‘moments of digital 
enthusiasm’. These are defined as ‘necessarily transient phases of intense, positive emotional 
mood emerging in political online conversations in proximity to major protest events’ (2016: 
255). Quantitative analysis illustrated increased frequency of likes and comments. These data 
stood as proxies for emotion and attention around key events. Qualitative analysis of 
comments focused on tone and the use of exclamation marks, capitalized words and 
emoticons. 
 
We must turn to the emergent hate speech literature for conceptualisation of what antagonism 
looks like on Twitter. In their review of existing studies, Burnap and Williams (2016: 5) find 
the presence of hate and antagonism have been measured in terms of use of profane or 
pejorative words, use of first and second person pronouns, use of accusational terms, and use 
of ‘othering’ language that presents a ‘we-they’ dichotomy on religious or other grounds and 
is derogatory about the ‘they’. Through computational linguistics and the use of multiple 
human coders they are able to analyse these grammars and vocabularies with high reliability. 
Despite these tools, however, they ultimately only evaluate whether such speech is present or 
absent. Equally, in their study of responses to the 2013 Lee Rigby terrorist attack they 
measure a Tweet’s sentiment as either positive, negative or neutral (Williams and Burnap, 
2016). Measuring antagonism and the emotions surrounding antagonism on a spectrum or 
scale – quite antagonistic, very antagonistic – is too complex even for computational methods 
and large human teams. 
 
For this reason, as a small-scale human-coding project, we look for the presence of 
antagonism and agonism and see how these associate with retweeting and other observable 
user behavior. We draw upon Mouffe’s conception of democratic talk proceeding through 
agonism, in which one considers one’s political opponent at least to be a legitimate adversary 
rather than, in antagonistic talk, an enemy to be eliminated (Mouffe, 1993; 2000). For Mouffe, 
politics involves articulatory practices linking or not linking certain issues and identities, for 
instance those seeking to link migrants, terrorism and the internet as a way to draw 
boundaries between a threatened “us” and dangerous “them”. There is no possibility of 
resolution because the political principles under dispute, such as freedom of movement, 
physical security and equal rights, cannot all be fully realized. This ‘undecidability’ keeps 
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politics open (Mouffe, 1992a: 13). The political space, for Mouffe, is a community held 
together by ‘public concern’, not by an idea, network shape, or identity (Mouffe, 1992b: 233). 
A Twitter conversation cohered by a hashtag enables that focus of public concern. While we 
expect most users to find a limit to the space of those sharing their opinion, in finding that 
limit and being exposed to other views, users realise the contestability of the issue (cf. Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1988, 93-148).  
 
We extend Mouffe’s conception to include the referent. We do so in a way consistent with 
Schmittian aspect of Mouffe’s thought, namely that politics involves a firm line between 
friend and enemy (Mouffe, 1993; Schmitt, 1976). In an agonistic tweet, the user considers 
those being discussed – migrants, refugees, ethnic or religious minorities – a legitimate 
adversary whose place within democratic society can be acknowledged. In an antagonistic 
tweet, the user can express antagonism not just in response to another user’s tweet, but by 
considering referents being discussed – again migrants, refugees, ethnic or religious 
minorities – as outside the legitimate polity: to be arrested, expelled and/or killed.  
 
Methodology 
 
This research is based on qualitative and quantitative analysis of Tweets for the five days 
following the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015.  The research question and hypotheses 
driving this study are: 
RQ1: What are the main differences in the contents, sources, and diffusion networks of the 
tweets about the Paris and Syria attacks? 
H1: Agonism and antagonism are driven by a conflation of media, migration and terrorism. 
H2: Antagonism is associated with retweet volumes: Tweets that are antagonistic are more 
likely to be retweeted. 
 
Our workflow model to answer this question and test these hypotheses is: 
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i. We gathered all Tweets containing the hashtags #PrayforParis (N = 2,088,075) 
and #PrayforSyria (N = 829,053) via Twitter’s Search API1 in the time period 13-
18 November 2015.2 
ii. We cleaned the data by removing retweets, leaving a total of 269,075 unique 
tweets containing #PrayforParis and 56,618 unique tweets containing 
#PrayforSyria.3 
iii. Four coders agreed and discussed the coding frame in serial meetings. To 
guarantee reliability in our coding, we extracted random samples of tweets, 
ensuring that they contained an equal proportion of #PrayforParis and 
#PrayforSyria tweets, and each coder coded them independently. We ran four 
iterations of this procedure (N = 100 tweets in the first two rounds, N = 50 in the 
last two rounds), excluding at each round the variables for which we had achieved 
satisfactory reliability scores (which we report in the appendix).4 We excluded 
two variables from the original coding framework – the main purpose of the tweet 
and whether the tweet contained references to solidarity – because we did not 
achieve satisfactory reliability scores even after four iterations. 
iv. We subsequently generated a random sample (N = 4,500) that included an equal 
number of tweets from each corpora and coded it according to our finalized 
coding framework. We did not code a total 152 tweets that we identified as spam. 
                                                          
1 API stands for “Application Programming Interface” and is a set of instructions and protocols that enables 
users to access a web-based software application. Twitter’s API (https://dev.twitter.com/) allows researchers to 
retrieve public Twitter messages as well as relevant “metadata” such as the identifier of the user who posted 
them, date, location, language, and so forth. The Search API allows searching tweets posted during the previous 
week. We limited our search to tweets posted by users using English as the language of their Twitter interface so 
that most of the tweets we collected could be expected to be in English. To minimise loss of data due to 
technical errors, we ran multiple searches in parallel using the same keywords and subsequently combined the 
results from all searches, deleting duplicate messages we identified based on the unique identification number 
that Twitter assigns to each tweet when published. 
2 The first tweet in our collection was posted at 23:27 Paris time on 13 November 2015, about two hours after 
the reported occurrence of the first bombing. The last tweet was posted a few seconds before midnight on 18 
November 2015. 
3 As readers may note, excluding retweets left us with a relatively smaller number of tweets containing 
#PrayforSyria compared with #PrayforParis than in the original collection. This is because, as we shall see 
below, the tweets about Syria were substantially more likely to be retweeted than those about Paris. 
4 To assess our intercoder reliability we used two indices: Krippendorff’s alpha and average percent pairwise 
agreement. Given the exploratory nature of our research, we accepted as reliable the variables that achieved 
Krippendorrff’s alpha scores equal to or higher than .667 (as suggested by Krippendorff, 2004). For some 
dichotomous variables with heavily skewed distributions, we followed Bennett et al. (2011) and relied on 
percent agreement because in these instances measures such as Krippendorff’s alpha tend to underestimate 
intercoder reliability (see Neuendorf, 2002). In those instances, we treated variables where we had achieved 
percent agreement of 90% or above as reliably coded. 
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v. We ran univariate, bivariate and multivariate quantitative analyses on the dataset 
combining the variables we coded and some of the meta-data obtained from 
Twitter. 
vi. We tested inferences deriving from our quantitative analysis against small samples 
of relevant tweets. 
 
Our coding framework (see appendix) covered (A) type of actor, (B) location of actor, (C) 
type of tweet, (D) type of content shared, (E) attacks mentioned – Paris, Syria, or Elsewhere –, 
(F) topics mentioned – migration, foreign policy, terrorists, religion, mainstream media, 
social media, justice and fairness, and universalism –, and (G) agonism and antagonism. It 
was designed to identify the presence of agonism and antagonism and their associations with 
who is tweeting, how, and about what. We also gathered data on the numbers of friends and 
followers of each user in our sample and the retweet volume of each tweet.  
 
Given the exploratory nature of our research and the granularity of the concepts we wanted to 
measure, we relied on human coding not computational methods. Dictionary-based methods 
would have been very difficult to employ given the complexity of these topics and the fact 
that we aimed at comparing two different conversations that, as we will show, centred upon 
different topics. Although using machine learning techniques was a possibility for textual 
analysis, many tweets contained images and/or links to external websites, which we included 
in our content analysis and which would have been very difficult to train a computational tool 
to automatically analyse (for an overview of these methodologies see Ampofo et al., 2015).  
 
Analysis 1: Overall Differences Between Tweets Mentioning Paris and Syria 
 
We begin our analysis by comparing tweets mentioning the Paris and the Syria attacks in 
terms of their sources, contents, and network diffusion. A total of 2,639 tweets (61% of the 
4,348 we coded) mentioned Paris while 2,164 (50%) mentioned Syria.  
 
As Table 1 shows, users in Europe and North America constituted the source of most of the 
tweets for which we were able to identify a location, unsurprising given the Western-centric 
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geographical spread of Twitter users in general.5 European and North American users 
referenced the Paris attacks more frequently while users in Middle East and North Africa, 
South Asia and elsewhere in Asia, while less numerous in our dataset, tweeted more 
frequently about Syria. About two-thirds of tweets were posted by members of the public, 
and those users were more likely to mention the Paris than the Syria attacks. However, we 
found – albeit in small numbers – that mainstream media, NGOs, religious authorities, 
celebrity and commercial accounts were more likely to tweet about Paris and activist-
bloggers about Syria.  
 
Table 1 – Location and Types of Actors Posting Tweets about Paris and Syria 
 
Location of source Paris Syria % of 
sample 
Europe 80% 27% 17% 
North America 70% 39% 12% 
Other Asia 48% 60% 7% 
South Asia (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal) 34% 79% 5% 
Middle East and North Africa 49% 64% 2% 
Other Africa 63% 48% 2% 
South America 70% 44% 1% 
Australasia 71% 33% 1% 
Unclear 57% 55% 52% 
    
Type of actor Paris Syria % of 
sample 
Member of the public 61% 49% 67% 
Alternative media / blogger / citizen journalist / activist account 51% 63% 5% 
Commercial / business account 89% 16% 4% 
Celebrity 69% 37% 1% 
Mainstream media corporate account 78% 44% >1% 
Mainstream media personal/journalist account 78% 22% >1% 
                                                          
5 The large percentage of tweets whose location was coded as “Unclear” is because either those users either did 
not write any content in the “Location” field of their Twitter profiles or did not provide sufficient information to 
identify their location. 
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Pundit / opinion-writer 60% 40% >1% 
National or international politician, policymaker or public official 75% 25% >1% 
Local police / intelligence 50% 50% >1% 
Expert (academic, think tank, retired police etc.) 100% 0% >1% 
Non-Governmental Organisation or charity representative 85% 31% >1% 
Religious authority 92% 15% >1% 
Other 67% 33% >1% 
Unclear 55% 56% 22% 
 
Table 2 shows some further descriptive statistics on the content and the diffusion networks of 
tweets mentioning Paris and Syria. In both cases tweets were most likely to be textual not 
visual, but about one-fifth of tweets contained images. Tweets about Paris were twice as 
likely (18% versus 9%) than tweets about Syria to include links to other social media content. 
Screengrabs of visual tweets combining the Eiffel Tour with a peace symbol were popular – 
shared directly via Twitter or through a link to image-sharing social network Instagram.  
 
Table 2 – Types of Content Shared, Topics Mentioned, Degrees of Antagonism and 
Agonism, and Network Size of Tweets about Paris and Syria 
 
Type of content shared Paris Syria All tweets 
Only text 53% 67% 59% 
Images 23% 20% 22% 
Other social media 18% 9% 14% 
Other websites 5% 3% 4% 
Mainstream media 1% 1% 1% 
    
Topics mentioned Paris Syria All tweets 
Universalism 19% 18% 17% 
Justice and fairness 8% 27% 15% 
Foreign policy 7% 28% 15% 
Terrorists 5% 9% 6% 
Religion 6% 6% 6% 
Social media 3% 5% 4% 
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Mainstream media 2% 4% 2% 
Migration 1% 3% 2% 
    
Agonism and antagonism Paris Syria All tweets 
Agonistic 14% 41% 24% 
Antagonistic 2% 4% 3% 
    
 Paris Syria All tweets 
Mean retweets 2.96 31.84 17.21 
Median retweets 0 0 0 
Mean followers 4751 3553 4373 
Median followers 283 374 317 
Mean following 1102 1317 1198 
Median following 312 338 318 
 
Regarding topics mentioned, universalism was the most frequently mentioned topic across 
the whole dataset, equally present in both Paris and Syria tweets. However, there are striking 
differences in the extent to which those who posted about the two conflicts mentioned foreign 
policy and justice and fairness, of which there were three to four times more mentions in 
tweets about Syria than Paris. Tweets about Syria were also more likely, in smaller numbers, 
to mention mainstream media, migration and terrorism. The eight topics were entirely absent 
in 62% of tweets mentioning Paris, but only 33% of tweets mentioning Syria. This indicates 
that the tweets about Syria were substantially more political than those about Paris, a majority 
of which was not relevant to any of the topics we are interested here. Most of the Paris tweets 
that we coded as 0 in all the topic categories feature expressions of solidarity and generic 
statements of feeling shocked or scared. 
 
Our first hypothesis is therefore not supported here: The low occurrence of mentions of 
media, migration and terrorism suggests that the cycle of insecurity we expected to find was 
absent from discussions about Paris (only present in 7% of Tweets) and was not particularly 
visible in those about Syria either (15%). Users discussing Syria were concerned that France 
responded to the Paris attacks by intensifying its aerial military interventions in Syria. Users 
complained that the attacks on Paris received disproportionate attention from mainstream 
media, often expressed through sharing the image presented in Figure 2: 
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Figure 2. World media framing of Paris (artist Lee Marej)6 
 
 
 
In Figure 2 we find a number of elements: attention to conflict in countries beyond Paris or 
Syria; foreign policy in the form of bombs falling from the sky; and world media directing 
attention exclusively on Paris, with the hands conveying a sense of human agency and 
culpability for this decision.  
 
Tweets about Syria were more likely to be to either antagonistic or, by a substantial margin 
(41% to 14%), agonistic than those about Paris. With only 129 antagonistic tweets it was 
possible to read them as a sub-corpus after the coding. We found these 129 fell into groups: 
anti-Muslim tweets, most often from North America (‘Lots of taqiyya [Sharia-approved lying] 
over on the #PrayForSyria hashtag. Newsflash: The West doesn't fucking care about you 
primitive savages anymore.’); anti-racist tweets (‘Racist pigs die #PrayforSyria’); and users 
objecting to others posting #PrayforParis on the grounds that France is a secular nation and it 
was religiosity that drove the terrorists (‘I wish people would stop using #prayforparis - 
praying to some imaginary psychopath in the sky is the exact cause of this tragedy.’). While 
antagonistic tweets were the exception among all types of actors, tweets by activist-bloggers 
were most likely to be antagonistic (7.1 percent). The biographies of these antagonistic 
activist-bloggers contained hashtags such as #ObamaLiedFrenchDied, 
#MakeAmericaGreatAgain, #ISaluteWhitePeople and #ShiaGeonicide [sic]. However, given 
                                                          
6 Few mainstream or social media users credited this artist and simply shared the image unattributed. The 
original is found at: http://leemarejlu.wix.com/leemarej  
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the relatively small numbers of activist-bloggers, most antagonistic tweets came from 
members of the public. There were far more agonistic tweets and we explore this in the next 
section. 
 
Tweets about Syria received on average substantially more retweets than those about Paris. 
However, as the medians in Table 2 show, more than half of those tweets received no retweet 
whatsoever—to be more precise, 77% of tweets about Paris and 68% of those mentioning 
Syria received no retweet. We also found different network characteristics in tweets about 
Paris and Syria. Users tweeting about Syria had a more even balance between the number of 
accounts following them and the number of accounts they followed (on average, 3,553 
followers to 1,317 accounts followed) than users tweeting about Paris (mean of 4,751 to 
1,101). However, these differences largely cancel out if we look at median values, where 
those who tweeted about Syria had actually more followers (374 versus 283) than those who 
tweeted about Paris. Given that we know Paris tweets received less retweets, we can 
characterise the conversation about Paris as a broad exchange, with wide reach and potential 
audience, but less retweeting intensity. The conversation about Syria was more close-knit, 
with a more even distribution of followers and followed, and more retweeting intensity. 
 
 
Analysis 2: Patterns of Agonism and Antagonism  
 
The conversation about Syria was more argumentative than that about Paris in terms of 
antagonism and, especially, agonism. Now we examine these patterns more systematically by 
looking at the correlations across all the content variables we measured, which we show in 
Table 3. The correlations range from -1, which represents a perfect negative association, to 
+1, which represents a perfect positive association. For practical purposes, we will focus only 
on coefficients that are higher than .1 or lower than -.1 and that are statistically significant. 
This provides a good indicator of the strength of the association between two variables, that is, 
how likely it was that tweets featuring topic A also featured topic B. 
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Table 3 – Bivariate Correlations among Different Types of Contents of the Tweets 
 
  Migration Foreign 
policy 
Terrorists Religion Mainstream 
media 
Social 
media 
Justice,  
fairness 
Universalism Antagonistic Agonistic 
Migration 1 0.004 .079** 0.019 .103** -0.015 -0.003 -0.014 -0.010 .119** 
Foreign 
policy 
  1 .179** -.034* 0.011 -0.027 .291** -.082** .115** .519** 
Terrorists     1 .222** 0.028 0.008 -0.014 -0.023 .072** .261** 
Religion       1 .031* -0.012 -0.004 -.057** .049** .176** 
Mainstream 
media 
        1 .042** .117** -0.003 -0.016 .145** 
Social media           1 .040** -.070** 0.005 .082** 
Justice, 
fairness 
            1 -.066** 0.006 .453** 
Universalism               1 -.054** -.065** 
Antagonistic                 1 -.071** 
Agonistic                   1 
 
Note: cell entries are Pearson’s point-biserial correlations coefficients for dichotomous variables.  
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** correlation is significant at p≤.01  
* correlation is significant at p≤.05 
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The correlations in Table 3 point to a number of important patterns. First, tweets are far more 
likely to be agonistic on all topics except when mentioning universalism (the association with 
social media is also weak). In other words, to the extent that the tweets mentioned almost all 
of the political issues we coded, they were also likely to do so in argumentative fashion. 
Across the sample, users were more likely to be antagonistic only when tweeting about 
foreign policy, particularly users supporting French attacks on Syria, for example: ‘DON'T 
#PrayForSyria “If a spider bites you and runs away into a nest of spiders, how do you tell the 
spiders apart? DOESN'T MATTER!!”’ They were also more likely to be agonistic when 
discussing Syria, migration, foreign policy, religion, mainstream media, and justice and 
fairness. 
 
This picture is reinforced by other clear associations. Discussion of mainstream media is 
strongly associated with discussion of migration and justice and fairness. This indicates 
criticism of journalists in their coverage of migrants and their focus on certain conflicts but 
not others. We also find a clear association between mentions of religion and terrorists, 
constituted by references to the religiosity of the Paris Attacks protagonists. Users either 
inferred a likely Islamic motivation or expressed a desire that not all Muslims be implicated 
in the actions of a few. However, regarding hypothesis one and the conflation of media, 
migration and terrorism, the numbers of these tweets are too small within the dataset to 
suggest that these narratives were as widespread as we expected. Far greater numbers of 
tweets linked foreign policy with terrorism and justice and fairness.  
 
Universalism is far less likely to be expressed in discussions of foreign policy, when users 
discuss the French air strikes on Syria. Figure 3 below captures that sentiment: 
 
Figure 3 – A bomb inscribed with ‘From Paris with Love’7 
 
                                                          
7 This image is again without licence. News reports labelled it ‘photoshopped’ rather than assign credit to any 
photographer. 
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There was significant anger at the French government for launching airstrikes in response to 
the attacks. Many users posted statements along the lines of ‘do not respond to violence with 
violence’ or ‘do not fight fire with fire’. Ultimately, the three strongest positive correlations 
in the entire dataset demonstrate that high agonism was constituted by statements about the 
French foreign policy (.519**) and justice and fairness (.453**), and those two topics, as we 
already saw, were also strongly correlated with one another (.291**). We have also already 
seen that tweets about Syria were substantially more likely to be antagonistic. Taken together, 
these findings suggest that the most compelling evidence we found for a cycle of insecurity 
has to do with insecurity generated by Western foreign policy rather than with insecurity 
deriving from Islamic terrorism.  
 
Antagonistic tweets received a low mean of 3.22 retweets compared to a 17.3 retweet average 
for all tweets, but there was a noticeable difference between antagonistic tweets mentioning 
Paris, which had an average of 5.21 retweets, and antagonistic tweets mentioning Syria, 
which had an average of 3.74 retweets. In contrast, tweets that were agonistic received on 
average 13.1 retweets, but the difference between antagonistic tweets mentioning Paris and 
Syria was striking: while agonistic tweets about Paris were retweeted on average 4.45 times, 
agonistic tweets about Syria had on average 14.93 retweets. Agonistic tweets were often 
retweets and commented retweets of high profile critics of French foreign policy towards 
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Syria such as Farhan Khan Kirk. Kirk describes himself in his Twitter biography as a blogger 
and social media activist. He has over 100,000 followers. He regularly posted graphics that 
articulated a policy critique, such as Figure 4. below. Kirk accompanied this graphic with the 
statement, ‘#PrayForSyria Our enemy is not any religion, Our enemies are Corporates, The 
imperialists, The economic hitmen’. This was retweeted 400 times.  
 
Figure 4 – Graphic in a Farhan Khan Kirk agonistic tweet of 16 November 2015 
 
 
 
Responding to hypothesis two, this analysis suggests that antagonistic tweets do not attract 
retweets and drive conversation. However, whether a tweet is retweeted is more than simply a 
matter of whether it is agonistic or antagonistic. It also depends upon what topics it addresses, 
what content it conveys, how many followers its source has, and so forth. Only multivariate 
analysis can disentangle the role of these different factors, which we address in the next 
section.  
 
Analysis 3: Do Agonism and Antagonism Drive Retweeting, and What Else Does? 
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Table 4 shows the results of negative binomial regressions that predict the number of retweets 
obtained by each tweet in our dataset as a function of several independent variables. A 
negative binomial model is the most appropriate for the kind of data we are dealing with here, 
as the dependent variable is a count (the number of retweets) with very dispersed values and 
significant number of 0s, as highlighted earlier. We have built three different models: a first 
model with no interaction and two other models where we added interaction terms to capture 
different facets of the phenomena we are interested in and expand the analyses presented so 
far. 
In Model 1, the dependent variable is estimated as a function of the type of tweet 
(differentiating between simple tweets, replies, and commented tweets, with all other tweets 
serving as reference category), the number of followers of the account at the time the tweet 
was posted (which we logged due to the high skewedness of its distribution), the type of 
content shared (with text-only tweets serving as reference category), what attacks were 
mentioned by the tweet, what topics it mentioned, and whether it was antagonistic or 
agonistic.  
Results from Model 1 show that more retweets were likely from a straight tweet, by a user 
with more followers, containing images, and about Syria. Many of Farhan V. Kirk’s fitted 
this description. Second, more retweets were likely if a user mentioned religion and if the 
tweet was antagonistic. Such tweets contained statements along the lines of: Who are these 
monsters that did this? God will punish them. Or, why are you idiots praying, we are secular 
in France. Third, tweets were significantly less likely to be retweeted if they mentioned Paris, 
migration, the mainstream media, or social media. The latter tweets included those 
complaining about users only acting on social media or calling for prayers when “real” action 
was needed instead. Those kinds of criticism of other users were substantially unlikely to be 
shared by the users themselves.  
Model 2 builds on Model 1 by adding interaction terms that differentiate between tweets 
mentioning Paris and Syria with respect to the content features we coded. Given that we 
found important differences in the topics and levels of agonism and antagonism of tweets 
pertaining to those two different conversations (see Table 2), did such differences in content 
also predict differences in the number of retweets a tweet received? The coefficients for the 
interaction terms show that tweets about migration, those discussing universalism, and those 
that mentioned the mainstream media were less likely to be retweeted when they were about 
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Syria than when they were about Paris. By contrast, tweets about religion were significantly 
more likely to be retweeted when they mentioned Paris than when they mentioned Syria. This 
often involved users wishing to spread the idea that ‘Muslims are not terrorists’ after the Paris 
attacks. Tweets about social media show an interesting contrasting dynamic: if they 
mentioned Paris they were significantly more likely to be retweeted than if they mentioned 
Syria, but if they mentioned Syria they were significantly less likely to be retweeted than the 
average tweet. Users discussing Paris were more likely to share messages meta-
communicating about the role and use of social media, for instance to promote symbolic 
action such as coordinated online silence or the propagation of images expressing solidarity, 
which elicited more retweets. The contrary was true for users discussing Syria, where 
discussions of social media were more likely to be centred on social media users’ low interest 
for the plight of the Syrian people compared with the atrocities in Paris and elsewhere in the 
West, and these tweets were less likely to be retweeted. Interestingly, Model 2 also confirms 
that antagonistic tweets, albeit less numerous than agonistic ones in our sample, were more 
likely to be retweeted, but only if they were about Paris. Although tweets about Syria were 
generally more retweeted than those about Paris, all else being equal, antagonistic tweets 
about Paris received a greater marginal boost of retweets than antagonistic tweets mentioning 
Syria. This may be because of their rarity, or, on qualitative inspection, because they were 
retweeted frequently within tighter (North American) far right networks (see Analysis 1 
above).  
 
Finally, Model 3 also builds on Model 1 by adding four interaction terms that allow us to 
estimate whether tweets augmenting the moral panic-esque cycle of insecurity are more or 
less likely to be retweeted. With this set-up, the coefficient for “migration x terrorists”, for 
instance, allows estimation of how many retweets a tweet that features both migration and 
terrorists is predicted to achieve compared to a tweet that only features one of these two 
topics (while the coefficients for individual topics still capture the estimated number of 
retweets deriving from the presence of such topics). As can be seen from the last two 
columns of Table 4, tweets mentioning migration and terrorists, migration and mainstream 
media, and terrorists and mainstream media did not receive a significantly different number 
of retweets than tweets that only mentioned one of those topics. However, the fact that the 
coefficient for the three-way interaction between migration, terrorists, and mainstream media 
is positive and significant suggests that the conflation of those three topics, even if it only 
happened in a limited number of tweets, elicited a higher number of retweets than tweets 
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mentioning both only one and two of the issues comprising the cycle of insecurity. Thus, 
although we found that discussions of those issues was too limited to claim that this cycle 
narrative emerged with the intensity we had expected, the evidence suggests that, even if the 
conflation of these topics did not happen frequently, when it did it was met by a noticeable 
user response in terms of the number of retweets those tweets received. 
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Table 4 – Dependent Variable: Number of Retweets 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B Std. Error B Std. Error B Std. Error 
Type of tweet       
Tweet 1.703* .813 1.676* .802 1.683* .818 
Commented tweet .698 .846 .678 .835 .687 .852 
Reply .460 .958 .500 .945 .440 .963 
       
Account followers (logged) .717*** .054 .711*** .048 .717*** .054 
       
Type of content shared       
Mainstream media -.702 .492 -.604 .473 -.753 .497 
Other websites -.172 .646 -.160 .641 -.166 .648 
Social media -.404 .212 -.354 .219 -.421* .213 
Images 2.447*** .318 2.365*** .268 2.452*** .317 
       
Attacks mentioned       
Paris -.611** .222 -1.114* .447 -.617** .223 
Syria .749*** .228 .600** .203 .745*** .227 
Elsewhere .442 .229 .316 .226 .440 .229 
24 
 
       
Issues mentioned in the tweet       
Migration  -1.376* .543 -1.519** .538 -1.501* .606 
Migration (Paris) - - .566 1.277 - - 
Foreign policy  -.209 .237 -.044 .260 -.236 .239 
Foreign policy (Paris) - - -.421 .399 - - 
Terrorists  -.220 .248 -.328 .261 -.220 .253 
Terrorists (Paris) - - .152 .515 - - 
Religion  .772** .295 -.606 .323 .774** .295 
Religion (Paris) - - 1.824*** .512 - - 
Mainstream media  -.951** .315 -.921* .376 -1.021** .330 
Mainstream media (Paris) - - .146 .568 - - 
Social media  -1.210*** .264 -1.873*** .391 -1.189*** .265 
Social media (Paris) - - 1.241* .490 - - 
Justice and fairness  .148 .222 .049 .260 .145 .223 
Justice and fairness (Paris) - - .251 .375 - - 
Universalism  -.319 .194 -.663* .337 -.329 .195 
Universalism (Paris) - - .649 .375 - - 
       
Cycle of fear associations       
Migration x Terrorists - - - - -1.342 .818 
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Migration x Mainstream media - - - - .664 1.420 
Mainstream media x Terrorists - - - - -1.562 .898 
Migration x Mainstream media x Terrorists - - - - 4.547* 2.185 
       
Rhetorical scope (?) of the tweet       
Agonistic  .265 .163 .103 .237 .283 .161 
Agonistic (Paris) - - .277 .345 - - 
Antagonistic  1.142** .443 .136 .476 1.154** .444 
Antagonistic (Paris) - - 1.659* .782 - - 
       
Intercept -6.486*** .858 -6.039*** .837 -6.458*** .861 
Chi square 30842.43  25694.95  3043.57  
Log likelihood -5131.81  -5108.02  -513.07  
Note: N=4294. Cell entries are unstandardised coefficients for negative binomial regressions. ***p≤.001 **p≤.01 *p≤.05
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Conclusions 
 
An examination of tweets containing #PrayforParis and #PrayforSyria in the aftermath of the 
November 2015 Paris Attacks, operationalising complex and fuzzy concepts from political 
and social theory like justice, universalism, agonism and antagonism, has allowed us to 
explain the dynamics of these Twitter conversations. We aimed to identify and explain the 
main differences in the contents, sources, and diffusion networks of the tweets about the Paris 
and Syria attacks. We hypothesized first that agonism and antagonism would be driven by a 
conflation of the topics media, migration and terrorism and, second, that antagonism is 
associated with retweet volumes. In Analysis 1 and 2 we found little conflation of media, 
migration and terrorism; instead, users discussed Syria, foreign policy, and justice and 
fairness. We found antagonism in relatively few tweets but agonism and antagonism occurred 
more frequently in discussion of Syria. Analysis 3 explained the likely retweet rate of tweets 
not just as a matter of whether they were agonistic or antagonistic but accounting for other 
aspects of the tweet, user and network. Again we find small but interesting findings. While 
there are more retweets about Syria, an antagonistic tweet about Paris is relatively likely to 
achieve higher retweets. This points to important network characteristics among those 
tweeting aggressively about Paris and the need for revenge, or those furious about French air 
strikes on Syria. Similarly, the conflation of media, migration and terrorism was infrequent 
but when it did occur, retweets were high.  
 
What story does this leave us with? The Twitter conversations around #PrayforParis and 
#PrayforSyria cannot be reduced either to the contestation of global attention or a media-
driven cycle of insecurity. Tweets about social or mainstream media were not widely shared 
and links to news rare. Universalism was the most frequently mentioned theme. Users in all 
parts of the world engaged on all topics to some degree. Only in small networks within and 
across the two hashtag conversations did antagonism occur. In fact, the high degree of 
agonistic and non-visual tweets, particularly around Syria, suggests a robust exchange of 
claims and counter-claims. This is hardly the dystopian narrative of Twitter as a space of 
superficial memes and anonymous hate.  
 
This study opens up our horizons for considering political communication not only 
concerning Paris and Syria, Europe and the Middle East, but about how transnational 
connectivity functions around major events featuring conflict and suffering. First, research 
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must explain how visual communication has strategic effects. In Analysis 3 we found that, all 
else being equal, visual tweets receive more retweets, in particular if about the injustice or 
malign consequences of foreign policy. Users present and share photographs of victims: dead 
children or children crying over their dead parents, crying but mute to us, figures of absolute 
vulnerability because they lack all agency. Users describe ‘looking at those children … made 
me cry’. We experience not terror - an urge to flee - but horror: paralysis, repugnance, and 
isolation before the text (Cavarero, 2011). Bodies dismembered by bombs: the destruction of 
a person’s figural unity. What is the political strategy in sharing these photographs and 
eliciting horror? Is it to remind us that every day people do horrible things (Sontag, 2003); 
that our government’s bombing has horrible effects? Is the strategy to provoke questions 
rather than close reflection down? If so, the high degree of agonism present in these tweets 
suggests the strategy worked.  
 
Second, we must think through ethical questions about what constitutes adequate or proper 
understanding of distant others’ lives for us to respond as citizens. Problems loom concerning 
how ethics work in a global digital ecology and what Floridi labels the declining ‘right to 
ignore’. In some cases, thanks to smartphone video, tweets allowed us to hear survivors tell 
their stories and perhaps sense their full personhood. Often, subtitles were added. In the 
telling of their story, the survivors move from being a generic category, a what – potential 
migrants or terrorists to some, as we saw in antagonistic tweets – to a specific person, a who; 
their lives are narratable on their own terms (Cavarero, 2000 [1997]). However, does this 
create a different relation to the event for global audiences? Given these children are never 
named, will audiences ever hear from that specific child again and hear the rest of their story? 
Does a “whole” story require a mix of biography and autobiography, and thus a traditional 
journalist to narrate the name and context, and conduct follow-up interviews months and 
years later? If so, then the absence of links to mainstream media in our sample suggests this 
does not occur on Twitter. Furthermore, do the children themselves have control over their 
own representation? Do they even know their testimony is being shared on Twitter? Who 
checks whether the subtitles are accurate? Does their individuality matter at all, or are their 
videos only shared by Twitter users because their situation is taken to be typical, representing 
a collective suffering, metonymic both for individuals not in the frame and for the entire 
social body, tied to the label “Syrians” (cf. Gürsel, 2016)? 
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Building on this, third, we must confront the ethical dimensions of our methodological 
choices. There may have been fewer #PrayforSyria tweets due to lower internet penetration in 
North Africa and Middle Eastern countries yet the sentiments expressed therein may have 
been present via other mediums. A single-medium study necessarily omits the wider media 
ecology within which political claims are expressed and therefore omits those claims from 
public scholarship. It also omits how dynamics on that medium interact with dynamics on 
others, for instance how #PrayforSyria may have moved through broadsheet newspapers, 
Facebook and face-to-face conversations before reaching Twitter. Researchers must devise 
multi-method designs to capture these dynamics if the full richness of agonism, antagonism 
and the political are to be captured and explained.  
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Appendix: Code frame and intercoder reliability scores 
 
(A) TYPE OF ACTOR (Krippendorff's alpha =.692, achieved at 3rd iteration) 
1. Mainstream media corporate account 
2. Mainstream media personal/journalist account 
3. Alternative media / blogger / citizen journalist account 
4. Pundit / opinion-writer 
5. National or international politician, policymaker or public official 
6. Local police / intelligence 
7. Expert (academic, think tank, retired police etc) 
8. Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) or charity representative 
9. Religious authority 
10. Member of the public  
11. Bot 
12. Unclear 
13. Account no longer available  
14. Other  
 
(B) LOCATION OF ACTOR (identified solely on the basis of the “Location” information 
provided by users in their Twitter profile; no reliability tests were conducted for this variable 
as it simply involves converting geographical information) 
1. Europe 
2. Middle East 
3. Africa 
4. North America 
5. South America 
6. Asia 
7. Australasia 
8. Unclear 
 
(C) TYPES OF TWEET (Krippendorff's alpha =.721, achieved at 2nd iteration) 
1. Tweet – no user mentions and not a RT  
2. Retweet (RT) 
3. Modified tweet (MT) 
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4. Reply (@ mention)  
5. Other / unclear 
 
(D) TYPE OF CONTENT SHARED (Krippendorff's alpha =.810, achieved at 2nd iteration) 
1. Mainstream media 
2. Other websites 
3. Other social media 
4. Images 
5. Only text 
 
(E) ATTACKS MENTIONED (all coded as Yes/No) 
1. Paris (Krippendorff's alpha =.869, achieved at 1st iteration) 
2. Syria (Krippendorff's alpha =.961, achieved at 1st iteration) 
3. Elsewhere (Krippendorff's alpha =.942, achieved at 3rd iteration) 
 
(F) TOPICS MENTIONED (all coded as Yes/No) 
1. Migration (percent agreement = 99%, achieved at 1st iteration) 
2. Foreign policy (Krippendorff's alpha = .671; percent agreement = 94%, achieved at 1st 
iteration) 
3. Terrorists (percent agreement = 94%, achieved at 2nd iteration) 
4. Religion (Krippendorff's alpha = .692; percent agreement = 96%, achieved at 2nd iteration) 
5. Mainstream media (Krippendorff's alpha = .754; percent agreement = 98%, achieved at 1st 
iteration) 
6. Social media (percent agreement = 96%, achieved at 2nd iteration) 
7. Justice and fairness (percent agreement = 92%, achieved at 1st iteration) 
8. Universalism (Krippendorff's alpha = .774; percent agreement = 91%, achieved at 3rd 
iteration) 
 
(G) AGONISM AND ANTAGONISM (all coded as Yes/No) 
1. Is this tweet antagonistic? (percent agreement = 93%, achieved at 2nd iteration) 
2. Is this tweet agonistic? (Krippendorff's alpha = .751; percent agreement = 91%, achieved at 
3rd iteration) 
 
